Standardization Agreements, Intellectual Property Rights and Anticompetitive Concerns by Bonadio, E.
Bonadio, E. (2013). Standardization Agreements, Intellectual Property Rights and Anticompetitive 
Concerns. Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property(1), pp. 22-42. doi: 
10.4337/qmjip.2013.01.02 
City Research Online
Original citation: Bonadio, E. (2013). Standardization Agreements, Intellectual Property Rights 
and Anticompetitive Concerns. Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property(1), pp. 22-42. doi: 
10.4337/qmjip.2013.01.02 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/3696/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
1 | P a g e  
 
Standardization Agreements, Intellectual Property Rights and Anti-competitive Concerns 
Enrico Bonadio – City University London (*) 
 
The relationship between standardization processes, intellectual property rights and competition rules has increasingly 
become of interest in the recent years. Recent investigations of the European Commission confirm that standardization 
processes and in particular ownership of IPRs that cover standardized technology might in certain circumstances 
infringe competition rules. 
The article first explores the meaning and different forms of standardization. It then analyses selected parts of the 
Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-
operation agreements, in particular those parts that cover standardisation agreements. The Guidelines have been 
adopted by the Commission in December 2010 with a view to addressing the anti-competitive concerns stemming from 
inter alia standardisation agreements (eg, they encourage IPRs holders to disclose their exclusive rights before the 
adoption of the standard, as well as to give an irrevocable commitment to offer to license the IPR to all parties 
interested on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms: so-called FRAND commitment). 
The author will then present and comment on different points of view on whether the ownership of IPRs which cover 
standardized technologies really create market dominance capable of triggering anti-competitive behaviours. Finally, a 
set of additional solutions proposed by various legal scholars will be highlighted and commented. 
 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between standardisation processes, intellectual property rights (IPRs) and 
competition rules has increasingly become of interest in the past years. Such interest has recently 
been invigorated in Europe by the activity of the European Commission. 
In particular, on 13 February 2012 the Commission authorised the takeover by Google of the 
company Motorola. The proposed acquisition had been notified to the EU institution under Article 
4 Regulation 139/2004 (the Merger Regulation). The involvement of the Commission has been 
necessary since as a consequence of the deal Google has acquired roughly 8,000 patents from 
Motorola, such patents mainly focusing on wireless communication hardware and high-definition 
television. A number of these patents are standard essential pateŶts ;͞“EPs͟Ϳ, ie they cover 
standardised technology. 
A few weeks before releasing said decision, on 16 December 2011 the Commission had started 
proceedings against Honeywell to examine alleged anti-competitive practices with reference to 
the development of a new refrigerant for air conditioning systems in cars. The Commission fears 
that in the context of the standardisation process Honeywell failed to disclose its patents and 
patent applications while the refrigerant was being assessed and later failed to grant licenses on 
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. Subsequently on 30 January 2012 the Commission 
started a formal investigation against the mobile manufacturer Samsung. Indeed, the latter had 
recently asked for and enforced injunctions against competitors in several countries, including 
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some EU Member States, claiming infringements of its UMTS-related SEPs
1
. This behavior, stressed 
the Commission, might constitute abuse of dominant position under Article 102 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning European Union. Then, on 3 April 2012 the Commission opened two other 
investigations against Motorola in relation to similar allegedly anti-competitive behaviours
2
.  
These recent moves from the Commission confirm its fear that standardisation processes and in 
particular ownership of IPRs that cover standardized technology, might in certain circumstances 
infringe competition rules. It is therefore interesting to analyse first the meaning and different 
forms of standardisation and then the Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements
3
, which also 
cover standardisation agreements. The Guidelines have been adopted by the Commission in 
December 2010 with a view to addressing the anti-competitive concerns stemming from inter alia 
standardisation agreements (in particular, they encourage IPRs holders to disclose their exclusive 
rights before the adoption of the standard as well as to give an irrevocable commitment to offer to 
license the IPR to all parties interested on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms: so-
called FRAND commitment). The author will then present and comment on different points of 
view on whether the ownership of IPRs, which cover standardised technologies really create 
market dominance capable of triggering anti-competitive behaviours. Finally, a set of additional 
solutions proposed by various legal scholars will be highlighted and commented. 
2. Standardisation: benefits and concerns 
Standardisation aims at defining technical, quality, safety or health related specifications with 
which current or future products, manufacturing processes or services should comply
4
. Of 
particular importance are the standards on the environmental compatibility of goods or 
manufacturing processes
5
. 
                                                          
(*) Lecturer in law. Comments are welcome and should be sent to enrico.bonadio.1@city.ac.uk. An earlier version of 
this paper has been presented at the 2nd Leǆis Neǆis AŶŶual Legal aŶd PoliĐǇ CoŶfeƌeŶĐe ͞“taŶdaƌds aŶd PateŶts iŶ 
the ICT seĐtoƌ͟, held iŶ LoŶdoŶ ;UKͿ oŶ ϭϮ JuŶe ϮϬϭϮ. The authoƌ ǁould like to thank the anonymous reviewers 
for their valuable comments and suggestions. 
1
 UMTS stands for Universal Mobile Telecommunications System, the third generation mobile cellular technology for 
networks based on the GSM standard. 
2
 It should also be noted that on 31 May 2012 Google filed a complain with the Commission claiming that Microsoft 
and Nokia colluded with other companies to avoid promises both companies had made that they would license their 
standard essential patents on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions.   
3
 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal 
co-operation agreements (Official Journal C 11 of 14.1.2011). 
4
 See also Recital 1 of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European 
Standardisation and amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 
95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/105/EC and 2009/23/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council. 
5
 For a non exhaustive list of standards in different sectoƌs see Maƌk MaĐCaƌthǇ, ͞OpeŶ “taŶdaƌds, CoŵpetitioŶ aŶd 
PateŶt PoliĐies͟, unpublished Manuscript, July 2009, p. 1 (available at 
http://explore.georgetown.edu/publications/43082, last accessed on 15 June 2012). For a comprehensive overview 
of the economic aspects of standardization (which remain outside the scope of this article) see Knut Blind, 
The Economics of Standards, Theory, Evidence, Policy, Edward Elgar, 2004 (proposing a variety of 
interesting empirical analyses which reveal the driving forces and economic justification for standards). 
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Standardisation can take various forms. First, a product or some technical specifications may 
become de facto standards as a consequence of wide adoption by many players of a certain 
market: in such a case it is market dynamics which transform a product or technology into a 
standard
6
. Secondly, governments and other public bodies such as EU institutions can adopt 
legislation that provides that certain goods or technologies must comply with given standards. EU-
wide standards, in particular, boost the internal market by permitting companies and traders to 
sell their goods and services in all the Member States
7. “uĐh staŶdaƌds aƌe Đalled ͞legal 
staŶdaƌds͟. ThiƌdlǇ, pƌiǀate oƌgaŶizatioŶs gƌoupiŶg togetheƌ ǀaƌious ŵaƌket plaǇeƌs ĐaŶ ;foƌŵallǇ 
or less formally) co-operate and commonly develop standards. These organizations are known as 
͞staŶdaƌd settiŶg oƌgaŶizatioŶs͟ ;““OsͿ aŶd adopt pƌoĐeduƌes aŶd poliĐies that goǀeƌŶ the 
standardisation processes. Such policies and procedures aim at choosing the most appropriate 
technology as standard, based on technical merit and other relevant aspects. Even if these 
oƌgaŶisatioŶs aƌe pƌiǀate, it has ďeeŶ Ŷoted that theiƌ Ŷatuƌe is ofteŶ ͞Ƌuasi-legislatiǀe͟8. EU 
bodies, for example, can mandate a certain SSO to develop a specific standard and use the latter 
as a basis for regulation
9
. The present paper will focus on this latter category of standardisation 
processes. 
Standardisation is highly beneficial. It can secure efficiency gains and benefit consumers, by 
allowing manufacturers to increase the overall size of the markets and thus achieve economies of 
scale as well as to increase products substitutability. Standardisation is particularly important in 
the information and communication technology (ICT) field. Indeed, in this sector, more than in 
other fields, devices and services manufactured by different companies must be able to 
communicate with each other in order to work
10
. Standards are a necessary tool to promote such 
inter-opeƌaďilitǇ ;these aƌe kŶoǁŶ as ͞iŶteƌfaĐe staŶdaƌds͟Ϳ11. By ensuring that the goods 
produced by different companies are compatible and interoperable, standardisation increases 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
 
6
 Mark A. LeŵleǇ, ͞IŶtelleĐtual PƌopeƌtǇ ‘ights aŶd “taŶdaƌd-“ettiŶg OƌgaŶizatioŶs͟, ϵϬ California Law Review, pp. 
1896-1899 (noting that the Microsoft operating systems are de facto standards as no organization formally chose 
them but they have been de facto adopted by the market in light of their commercial success).  
7
 See also para 308 Guidelines. 
8
 Damien Geradin - Miguel ‘ato, ͞CaŶ “taŶdaƌd-Setting lead to Exploitative Abuse? A dissonant View on Patent Hold-
Up, ‘oǇaltǇ “taĐkiŶg aŶd the MeaŶiŶg of F‘AND͟, Apƌil ϮϬϬϲ, p. ϰ ;aǀailaďle at http://ssrn.com/abstract=946792, last 
accessed on 15 June 2012). 
9
 Rudi Bekkers – Isaďelle Liotaƌd, ͞EuƌopeaŶ “taŶdaƌds foƌ Moďile CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs: The TeŶse ‘elatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ 
“taŶdaƌds aŶd IŶtelleĐtual PƌopeƌtǇ ‘ights͟ ;ϭϵϵϵͿ European Intellectual Property Review, p. 115.  
10
 In this sector integration of previously disparate products has become more and more important. Take the case of 
smart-phones, which include various products and services (web browsers, music players, cameras, etc.) offered by 
different companies. See Rudi Bekkers – Christian Catalini – Arianna Martinelli – Timothy Simcoe, Intellectual Property 
Disclosure in Standards Development, paper prepared for the NBER conference on Standards, Patents & Innovation, 
Tucson (AZ), January 20 and 21, 2012 (available at http://cis.ier.hit-
u.ac.jp/Japanese/society/120412houtokeizai/Martinelli.pdf, last accessed on 12 May 2012), p. 14 
11
 See Lemley, above note 6, pp. ϭϴϵϯ aŶd ϭϴϵϲ ;iŶteƌestiŶglǇ ŶotiŶg that ͞telephoŶes talk to eaĐh otheƌ, the IŶteƌŶet 
ǁoƌks, aŶd haiƌdƌǇeƌs plug iŶto eleĐtƌiĐal soĐkets ďeĐause pƌiǀate gƌoups haǀe set ͚iŶteƌfaĐe͛ staŶdaƌds, alloǁiŶg 
compatibility between products made by different ŵaŶufaĐtuƌeƌs͟ aŶd that ͞ǁithout this staŶdaƌdizatioŶ, Ŷo oŶe 
Đould staǇ iŶ a hotel ƌooŵ aŶd haǀe aŶǇ ĐoŶfideŶĐe that his haiƌ dƌǇeƌ ǁould ǁoƌk iŶ the hotel͛s outlet͟Ϳ.  
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ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ ĐhoiĐes and reduces prices. More fungibility of diffeƌeŶt ŵaŶufaĐtuƌeƌs͛ goods is also 
triggered, which can drive prices further down. 
The benefits standardization, and in particular interface standardization, may bring have been 
ďƌilliaŶtlǇ suŵŵaƌized ďǇ Caƌl “hapiƌo. This authoƌ ƌeĐalls that ͞duƌiŶg the gƌeat Baltiŵoƌe fiƌe of 
1904, fire fighters called in from neighboring cities were unable to fight the blaze effectively 
because their hoses would not fit the Baltimore hydrants. The following year, national standards 
foƌ fiƌe hoses ǁeƌe adopted͟12.   
Standardisation however, may also cause negative externalities. Indeed, it reduces the number of 
formats and variations available. It follows that, once a standard has been adopted, companies 
that have previously used and massively invested on a different technology may face a barrier to 
entry and thus be excluded from the relevant market
13
. Standards can thus be manipulated to 
exclude the products of competitors from the market. Standard-setting activities might also 
facilitate the creation of cartels, eg when the participants fix prices of end-products or agree to 
limit output or restrict sales
14
. Thus, standardisation processes might dangerously cause both 
͞eǆĐlusioŶ͟ aŶd ͞ĐollusioŶ͟. 
Moreover, when patents or other IPRs are obtained which cover standards
15
, further concerns 
may arise. This is even more so in the ICT field, which has recently witnessed an increase in the 
number of patents covering software-related inventions and business methods. There is indeed a 
conceptual tension between IPRs (which offer their owners monopolistic rights and are destined 
for private and exclusive use
16
) and standards (intended instead for widespread and collective 
use). The intellectual property, and in particular patent, protection of standardised technology 
allow IPRs owners to prohibit third parties to use such technology, turning the standard from an 
͞opeŶ͟ iŶto a ͞Đlose͟ standard17. Owners of standard essential IPRs can thus be given a market 
power that in certain circumstances might be abused or lead to restrictive practices. This is 
particularly true in case of complex products that include many IPRs-protected standards, eg ICT 
products such as smart-phones incorporating a camera, a video, a web browser, wireless, text 
messages, etc. In these cases standards are subject to overlapping IPRs protection: if even a small 
                                                          
12
 Caƌl “hapiƌo, ͞“ettiŶg CoŵpatiďilitǇ “taŶdaƌds: CoopeƌatioŶ oƌ CollusioŶ?͟, iŶ ‘oĐhelle Dreyfuss - Diane Zimmerman 
– HaƌƌǇ Fiƌst, Eds, ͞EǆpaŶdiŶg the BouŶds of IŶtelleĐtual PƌopeƌtǇ͟, OUP ϮϬϭϭ, “eĐtioŶ ϭ. 
13
 Emma Johansson, ͞AssessŵeŶt of “taŶdaƌdizatioŶ AgƌeeŵeŶts uŶdeƌ the ‘eǀised GuideliŶes oŶ HoƌizoŶtal 
CoopeƌatioŶ AgƌeeŵeŶts͟, ϭϴ Columbia Journal of European Law, L.F. 17 (2011), available at 
http://www.cjel.net/online/18_1-johansson (last accessed on 12 May 2012). 
14
 MaƌĐus Gladeƌ, ͞OpeŶ “taŶdaƌds: PuďliĐ PoliĐǇ AspeĐts aŶd CoŵpetitioŶ Laǁ ‘eƋuiƌeŵeŶts͟ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ European 
Competition Journal, p. 626. 
15
 An intellectual property rights is deemed essential if one cannot implement the standard without infringing it. For a 
recent and deep analysis of standard essential IPRs, with particular reference to the ICT sector, see Claudia Tapia, 
Industrial Property Rights – Technical Standards and Licensing Practices (FRAND) in the Telecommunications Industry, 
Heymanns Verlag Gmbh, 2010. 
16
 ‘eĐital ϰ of T‘IP“ AgƌeeŵeŶt ĐoŶfiƌŵs that ͞iŶtelleĐtual pƌopeƌtǇ ƌights aƌe pƌiǀate ƌights͟. 
17
 Not all staŶdaƌds aƌe ͞Đlose͟, though. MaŶǇ IŶteƌŶet ƌelated teĐhŶologies aƌe good eǆaŵples of staŶdaƌdized 
teĐhŶologies that haǀe ƌeŵaiŶed ͞opeŶ͟. “ee LeŵleǇ, aďoǀe Ŷote …, p. ϭϴϵϯ ;ŶotiŶg that the IŶteƌŶet ƌuŶs a set of 
open and non-proprietary protocols largely because the SSO which controls the IP protocols, ie the Internet 
Engineering Task Force, had a policy that it would not adopt proprietary standards). 
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number of right owners require standards implementers to pay royalties, such implementers, even 
the most efficient ones, may wish not to manufacture the products in question as it would be 
economically inconvenient
18. As has ďeeŶ Ŷoted, iŶ the ICT field ͞Ǉou ƌegulaƌlǇ haǀe to ĐoŵďiŶe 
ϱϬ, ϭϬϬ, eǀeŶ ϭ,ϬϬϬ, oƌ … ϭϬ,ϬϬϬ diffeƌeŶt pateŶt ƌights togetheƌ iŶto oŶe pƌoduĐt. You͛ǀe got to 
Đleaƌ all those ƌights … iŶ oƌdeƌ to get Ǉouƌ pƌoduĐt to the ŵaƌket͟19. 
3. The CoŵŵissioŶ’s Guidelines on standardisation agreements 
As mentioned above, the Commission has recently dealt with standardisation agreements, ie 
those agreements adopted by SSOs with a view to choosing the most appropriate technologies as 
standards. Such choices are often the result of compromises between the developers and the 
implementers of the technologies in question. 
In particular, on 14 December 2010 the Commission adopted the Guidelines on the applicability of 
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation 
agreements
20
, which also include a section on standardisation agƌeeŵeŶts ;͞GuideliŶes͟Ϳ21. 
                                                          
18
 In these cases, the aggregate royalty fees to be paid by the standard implementer can reach very large amounts, 
sometimes so large to render the production of the product incorporating the standards no longer economically 
convenient. This phenomenon is kŶoǁŶ as ͞ƌoǇaltǇ staĐkiŶg͟. “ee also AŶdƌeǁ Updegƌoǀe, ͞The EsseŶtial Guide to 
Standards – Chapteƌ ϰ: IŶtelleĐtual PƌopeƌtǇ ‘ights aŶd “taŶdaƌd “ettiŶg͟ ;ϮϬϬϳͿ, p. ϭ ;aǀailaďle at 
http://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/intellectual.php, last accessed on 15 June 2012); Doug Lichtman, 
͞PateŶt Holdouts iŶ the “taŶdaƌd-“ettiŶg PƌoĐess͟ ;ϮϬϬϲͿ U Chicago Law and Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 292, 
p. 1 (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=902646: noting that the protocol that governs 
how information is stored on DVD-R media - a format for optical disc data storage that uses digital recording - is 
protected by 177 different patents and that the Radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology - ie a wireless non-
contact system that uses radio-frequency electromagnetic fields to transfer data from a tag attached to an object, for 
the purposes of automatic identification and tracking - iŵpliĐates ŵoƌe thaŶ ϰ,ϬϬϬ pateŶtsͿ; LeŵleǇ, aďoǀe Ŷote …, 
pp. 1898 and 1933 (noting that it is more difficult to design around IPRs-protected compatibility standards than 
designing around other types of standards such as safety and quality standards. The author stresses that quality and 
safety standards are usually non-exclusive whereas the adoption of an interface standard is more likely to exclude 
other possible interface protocols). 
19
 Maƌk A. LeŵleǇ, ͞TeŶ ThiŶgs to Do Aďout PateŶt Holdup of “taŶdaƌds ;aŶd OŶe Not toͿ͟ ;ϮϬϬϳͿ Boston College 
Law, Vol. 48, p. 149, Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 923470, p. 2 (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=923470, last accessed on 15 June 2012). 
20
 AƌtiĐle ϭϬϭ;ϭͿ TFEU pƌoǀides that ͞The folloǁiŶg shall ďe pƌohiďited as iŶĐoŵpatiďle ǁith the iŶteƌŶal ŵaƌket: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may 
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion 
of competition within the internal market, and in particular those which: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or 
selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or 
investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts 
subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
ĐoŵŵeƌĐial usage, haǀe Ŷo ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ ǁith the suďjeĐt of suĐh ĐoŶtƌaĐts͟. 
21
 Although they are not binding, the Guidelines provide valuable clarifications about the applicability of EU 
competition rules to the agreements in question. See Mathew Heim, ͞Some Observations on the Treatment of 
Standardization Agreements in the EC Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements͟, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, February 2011, 
p. 5, available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/some-observations-on-the-treatment-of-
standardization-agreements-in-the-ec-guidelines-on-horizontal-cooperation-agreements (last accessed on 9 May 
2012). The 2011 Guidelines repealed the guidelines adopted by the Commission in 2001, which were however less 
detailed. The Commission had referred to the principles contained in the 2001 Guidelines in a series of cases, including 
the Qualcomm (the proceedings were closed on 24 November 2009, MEMO/09/516 Brussels), IPComm (the 
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The Guidelines first underline the generally pro-competitive nature of standardisation and of the 
use of IPRs in standards. Yet, they also express worries. A major concern is that the ownership and 
exercise of IPRs on standards could permit their owners to control the product or service market 
to which the standard relates and accordingly carry out activities capable of restricting trade and 
in particular creating barriers to the entry into the relevant market: eg IPRs holders could require 
extremely high and/or discriminatory royalties or refuse to license their essential rights, which in 
turn would restrict effective access to the standard
22
. Some of these behaviours can be caught, 
depending on the circumstances, by both Article 101 (on prohibition of restrictive agreements) 
and Article 102 (on prohibition of abuse of dominant position) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU)
23
. The Guidelines further note that the issue of market power can only 
be examined on a case-by-case basis, as there is no presumption that ownership of standard 
essential IPRs amounts ipso facto to market dominance
24
. This entails that in the absence of 
market power standardisation agreements are not capable of restricting competition
25
. 
The GuideliŶes theŶ pƌoǀide a ͞safe haƌďouƌ͟ eǆĐeptioŶ. It ŵeaŶs that ĐeƌtaiŶ staŶdaƌdisation 
agreements that are capable of creating market power do not infringe Article 101(1) TFEU if they 
satisfy certain requirements. First, the agreement in question should contain no obligation for its 
parties to comply with the standard
26
. Second, participation in standard-setting must be 
unrestricted: all competitors in the relevant market should therefore, be able to take part in the 
process leading to the choice of the standard
27
. Third, the procedure for the selection of standards 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
proceedings were closed on 10 December 2009, MEMO/09/549) and Rambus cases. In the latter case, in particular, 
the CoŵŵissioŶ͛s stateŵeŶt of oďjeĐtioŶs of August ϮϬϬϳ feaƌed that ‘aŵďus had aďused its doŵiŶaŶt positioŶ uŶdeƌ 
(what is now) Article 102 TFEU by inter alia charging unreasonable fees for the exploitation of its patents covering a 
technology necessary to meet industry-wide standards set for dynamic random access memory chips (DRAMs). 
Rambus then offered commitments to limit its royalties and the Commission accepted these commitments in 
DeĐeŵďeƌ ϮϬϬϵ ;see CoŵŵissioŶ͛s pƌess ƌelease at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1897&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLa
nguage=en, last accessed on 15 June 2012). 
22
 Para 269 Guidelines. 
23
 This ĐoŶfiƌŵs that soŵe pƌoǀisioŶs of the GuideliŶes, despite theiƌ offiĐial Ŷaŵe ;͞GuideliŶes oŶ the AppliĐaďilitǇ of 
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-opeƌatioŶ AgƌeeŵeŶts͟Ϳ aƌe also 
applicable to Article 102. See EuƌopeaŶ CoŵpetitioŶ Laǁ Foƌuŵ ;ECLFͿ, ͞CoŵŵeŶts oŶ the Dƌaft GuideliŶes on the 
applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation 
agƌeeŵeŶts͟ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ p. 16 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_horizontals/eclf_en.pdf, 
last accessed on 15 June 2012).. AƌtiĐle ϭϬϮ TFEU pƌoǀides that ͞AŶǇ aďuse ďǇ oŶe oƌ ŵoƌe uŶdeƌtakiŶgs of a 
dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a) 
directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting 
production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the 
conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature 
oƌ aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ĐoŵŵeƌĐial usage, haǀe Ŷo ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ ǁith the suďjeĐt of suĐh ĐoŶtƌaĐts͟. 
24
 Para 269 Guidelines. 
25
 Para 277 Guidelines. 
26
 Para 280 Guidelines. 
27
 Para 281 Gudelines. 
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should be transparent: it must permit all stakeholders to effectively be informed about all the 
pertinent work in good time and at each phase of the procedure
28
.  
In case of standard involving IPRs, participants to the SSO who wish to have such rights included in 
the standard (and want to take advantage from the safe harbour exception) should also comply 
with two other requirements: (i) ex ante good faith disclosure of their IPR that might be essential 
foƌ the iŵpleŵeŶtatioŶ of the staŶdaƌd uŶdeƌ deǀelopŵeŶt ;͞eǆ aŶte͟ ŵeaŶiŶg ďefoƌe the 
adoption of the standard) and (ii) irrevocable commitment to offer to license the IPR to all parties 
interested on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (so-called FRAND commitment)
29
. 
By imposing the first requirement, the Guidelines aim at encouraging disclosure of all relevant IPRs 
before the standard is eventually adopted
30
. The imposition of this requirement is useful for other 
SSO participants that can thus preliminarily verify which technologies, amongst the ones taken 
into account by the organization, are covered by IPRs and the relevant owners
31
: eg participants 
may wish to adopt a technology protected by as few IPRs as possible
32
. SSOs could thus choose a 
standard that is not locked in any IPR so as to guarantee more competition
33
. 
With the second requirement the Guidelines want to guarantee that all interested third parties, in 
paƌtiĐulaƌ IP‘s holdeƌs͛ Đoŵpetitoƌs that ŵust iŵpleŵeŶt the staŶdaƌdised technology covered by 
                                                          
28
 Para 282 Gudelines. 
29
 Paras 284-291 Guidelines. FRAND commitments are also referred to in the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on European Standardisation and amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC 
and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 
2009/105/EC and 2009/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (Annex II para 2). 
30
 For a description of IP disclosure processes and an overview of disclosure related data, see Bekkers – Catalini – 
Martinelli – Simcoe, above note 10. It has also been argued that a belated disclosure, ie after the standard has been 
adopted, could also be accepted provided that it is made in good faith: see European Competition Law Forum (ECLF), , 
above note 23, p. 10.   
31
 It would indeed be prohibitively expensive for such companies to carry out patent searches on national and 
international registries in order to find out whether the standards in question are covered by patents. 
32
 Johansson, above note 13. “ee also Deďoƌah Platt Majoƌas, ͞‘eĐogŶiziŶg the Pƌo-Competitive Potential of Royalty 
DisĐussioŶs iŶ “taŶdaƌd “ettiŶg͟, ‘eŵaƌks ďefoƌe the “taŶfoƌd UŶiǀeƌsitǇ CoŶfeƌeŶĐe oŶ “taŶdaƌdizatioŶ aŶd the Law: 
Developing the Golden Mean for Global Trade (2005) (available on the Internet at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf, last accessed on 8 August 2012).  
33
 Failure to disclose standard essential IPRs may therefore have a negative effect on competition. It is interesting to 
mention the US cases (i) In re Rambus, Inc., No 9302, Opinion of the Commission (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006, holding Rambus 
liable for monopolization for hiding the existence of patents in order to influence the adoption of a certain standard. 
Yet, this decision has been reversed in the appeal proceedings); (ii) In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (May 20, 
1996, holding that Dell had failed to disclose that it owned a patent that it thought would be violated by any 
implementation of the standard in question; such conduct was held as a violation of antitrust laws). On the Rambus 
Đase see Heƌďeƌt HoǀeŶkaŵp, ͞PateŶt DeĐeptioŶ iŶ “taŶdaƌd “ettiŶg: the Case foƌ AŶtitƌust PoliĐǇ͟ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ U Iowa 
Legal Studies Research Paper, pp. 5-20 (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1138002, 
last accessed 15 June 2015). In general, on the position taken by the US F.T.C and the Department of Justice on the 
antitrust issues that may stem from collaborative standard setting when standards incorporate IPR-protected 
technologies, see their joint publication Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation 
and Competition, April 2007 (available online at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf, last accessed on 7 
August 2012). 
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the IPR, have effective access to it
34
: which in turn can stimulate competition through innovation, 
quality and price
35
. This is particularly important when the standard has been incorporated into a 
legislative instrument, such as an EU act. As we have seen, in this case that standard would 
become a legal standard, and access to it would be the only lawful means for having access to the 
market. FRAND commitments need to be given by IPRs owners before the adoption of the 
standard. In such a way IPR holders would not be in a position (or would be less inclined, for fear 
of litigation) to request unreasonable and unfair royalties by leveraging the fact that the 
technology in question has been adopted as a standard
36
. 
What happens if a standardization agreement does not satisfy the above requirements? Can it still 
be accepted under EU competition law and in particular Article 101 TFEU? It can be accepted if it 
complies with paragraph 1 of this article as a consequence of an effects based assessment: for 
example, if the standardisation agreement binds the member to only manufacture the goods in 
compliance with the standard, the risk of restricting competition is great. On the contrary, 
standards that cover just minor aspects or parts of the end-product are less likely to restrict 
competition
37
. The effects based assessment can be carried out taking into consideration the 
following factors (inter alia): the accessibility of the standards, whether the procedure for 
choosing the standard is open to all the players of the market, the market shares of the relevant 
goods or services and the possibility for participants to adopt alternative standards
38
. 
If the agreement does not pass the effects based test, it could still be accepted under Paragraph 3 
of Article 101 TFEU
39
. As is known, this provision provides an exemption for (otherwise unlawful) 
practices that contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods, or to promoting 
                                                          
34
 Implementers of standards are obviously interested in minimizing the level of royalties to be paid to IPRs owners 
and accordingly they are strong supporters of FRAND, whereas IPRs holders tend whenever possible to water down 
FRAND obligations related to royalty rates (however, the latter position is difficult to support as during the negotiation 
process implementers may threaten to challenge the validity and/or essentiality of the patent). There are also 
companies that are both IPRs owners and implementers: in such cases they try to strike a balance between these two 
positions. See Gordon Christian – “iŵoŶ Holŵes, ͞“taŶdaƌd “ettiŶg – The European CoŵŵissioŶ͛s Ŷeǁ appƌoaĐh͟ 
(January 2011) Competition Law Insight, p. 11.  
35
 Glader, above note 14, p. 620. 
36
 Para 287 Guidelines. FRAND commitments can be assessed according to different criteria. For example, in case of 
dispute the assessment of whether fees charged for access to IPR are unfair or unreasonable should be based on 
whether the fees bear a reasonable relationship to the economic value of the IPR (para 289 Guidelines). The following 
ĐoŵŵeŶts Đould also ďe dƌaǁŶ: ;iͿ the teƌŵs ͞faiƌ͟ ŵaǇ suggest a pƌiŶĐiple of eƋuitaďle tƌeatŵeŶt of eaĐh liĐeŶsee iŶ 
light of the circumstances of implementation; (ii) licence fees which do not allow the licensee to market the final 
product at an appropriate price might be considered unreasonable (it could also be said that a fee can be considered 
reasonable if it is balanced and not excessive in terms of the connection to the benefits brought by the relevant 
technology); (iii) if different terms and conditions are offered by the patentee based on the fact that the licensee is a 
direct or a more distant and less dangerous competitor, said licensing policy could be considered discriminatory. 
37
 See para 293 Guidelines. 
38
 See paras 292-307 Guidelines. It should however be noted that the possibility to switch to alternative technologies 
after a standard is adopted remains a theoretical option in light of the reasons referred to in the next paragraph.  
39
 Paras 308-324 Guidelines. 
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technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. For 
example, in order to avoid disputes related to FRAND commitments, the Guidelines encourage ex 
ante disclosures of most restrictive licensing terms, such as the maximum royalty rate. Far from 
being an unlawful price restriction
40
, said disclosures aim at fully informing SSO participants about 
the likely cost of any IPR related to the standard
41
. A standardisation agreement that envisages 
such disclosure would thus be exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU as it guarantees a transparent 
procedure and would even enhance competition between technologies by permitting the price to 
be auctioned down before adopting the standard (on the contrary, failure to disclose restrictive 
licensing terms would have negative effects on competition)
42
. In other words, as has been noted, 
keeping in the dark implementers of standardised technology (from the outset of the 
standardisation process) about the terms on which the latter will be available is capable of 
subverting the competitive process
43
.  
Frand commitments in case of transfer of standard essential IPRs  
The assignment of standard essential IPRs after the adoption of the standard may also raise a 
delicate issue. 
Indeed, if the assignee of an essential standard IPR does not undertake to offer the licence on to 
same FRAND terms as those given by the assignor, a risk would arise that the assignee itself 
remains free to carry out anti-competitive activities such as requesting excessive or discriminatory 
royalties. In other words, an IPR owner could offer FRAND commitments and assign the relevant 
IPR to another company that then claims not to be bound by those commitments. That is why the 
Guidelines stress that SSOs policies should require that IPRs owners which have participated in the 
standard-setting activity and have given a FRAND commitment, make sure that all assignees of 
said IPRs accept to be bound by the same commitments: eg a clause referring to FRAND should be 
enclosed into the contract between assignor and assignee
44
. Similar commitments have been 
made by Google in February 2012 (after acquiring Motorola) in a letter addressed to the European 
Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI). In particular, Google represented that it would be 
irrevocably bound by the FRAND commitments given by Motorola, the previous owner of the 
                                                          
40
 Updegrove, above note 18, para 6.1 (noting that ex ante disclosure can be considered favorably by regulators and 
has precompetitive, rather than anticompetitive, effects). 
41
 Para 299 Gudelines. On the effects of ex ante disclosure of licensing terms on the development of standards see 
Joƌge L. CoŶtƌeƌas, ͞AŶ EŵpiƌiĐal “tudǇ of the EffeĐts of Eǆ-Ante Licensing Disclosure Policies on the Development of 
VoluŶtaƌǇ TeĐhŶiĐal “taŶdaƌds͟, AŵeƌiĐaŶ UŶiǀersity, Washington College of Law, Washington DC, June 2011 
(available on the Internet at  http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/standards/exantereport.pdf, last accessed on 8 
August 2012). 
42
 Joahnsson, above note 13.  
43
 Joseph Farrell - John Hayes - Carl Shapiro - Theƌesa “ulliǀaŶ, ͞“taŶdaƌd “ettiŶg, PateŶts, aŶd Hold-Up͟ ;ϮϬϬϳͿ ϳϰ 
Antitrust Law Journal No. 3, p. 609. 
44
 Para 285 Guidelines. 
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essential patents; and that it would be bound by the maximum royalty rate of 2.25% of the net 
selling price of the relevant end product (previously agreed upon by Motorola)
45
. 
4. Does the ownership of standard essential IPRs really create market dominance capable 
of triggering anticompetitive behaviors? 
We have seen that the Guidelines express concerns about the fact that the ownership and 
exercise of IPRs in standards might turn out to infringe competition rules. There is much debate on 
whether the ownership of standard essential IPRs per se, really creates market dominance and 
whether such power can be used by IPRs holders to engage in anti-competitive conducts. 
The Commission’s stance in the Google Motorola decision 
It is pƌeliŵiŶaƌilǇ iŶteƌestiŶg to ĐoŵŵeŶt oŶ tǁo CoŵŵissioŶ͛s oďseƌǀatioŶs iŶ the Google 
Motorola proceedings. These observations are particularly noteworthy as the Commission, in 
clarifying the issue of market dominance stemming from ownership of SEPs, went beyond the 
Guidelines. 
First, the Commission held that a SEP must be deemed as a separate market in itself, as pateŶtee͛s 
competitors have no alternative for complying with the standard but to work the SEP covered 
invention. The SEP cannot therefore, be designed around
46
. It seems that the Commission pushed 
the argument that each SEP owner ipso facto (ie for the mere fact of owning a SEP) enjoys market 
power in the relevant market. This finding seems to go ďeǇoŶd the GuideliŶes͛ pƌoǀisioŶs, ǁhiĐh 
instead stress that the issue of market power can only be examined on a case-by-case basis, as 
there is no presumption that ownership of essential IPRs per se amounts to market power
47
. 
The Commission also noted that a SEP owner could threaten to ask for injunctions against 
competitors at any time (injunctions are widely sought by patentees in the ICT sector). In 
particular, it fears that national courts grant injunctions without a careful assessment of whether 
                                                          
45
 See Para 121 Google Motorola decision. For cases in which purchasers of patents claimed not to be bound by a prior 
FRAND see Roger G. Brooks – DaŵieŶ GeƌadiŶ, ͞IŶteƌpƌetiŶg aŶd EŶfoƌĐiŶg the VoluŶtaƌǇ F‘AND CoŵŵitŵeŶt͟ ;ϮϬϭϭͿ 
International Journal of IT Standards and Standardization Research, 9(1), p. 29. 
46
 Para 61 Google Motorola decision. 
47
 Paƌa Ϯϲϵ GuideliŶes. The CoŵŵissioŶ͛s fiŶdiŶg eĐhoes the stateŵeŶts ŵade ďǇ the CoŵpetitioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ, 
JoaƋuiŶ AlŵuŶia, oŶ ǀaƌious oĐĐasioŶs. OŶ ϭϬ FeďƌuaƌǇ ϮϬϭϮ he Ŷoted that ͞OǁŶeƌs of suĐh staŶdaƌd essential 
pateŶts aƌe ĐoŶfeƌƌed a poǁeƌ oŶ the ŵaƌket that theǇ ĐaŶŶot ďe alloǁed to ŵisuse͟ ;pƌess ƌelease aǀailaďle at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/83&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui
Language=en, last aĐĐessed oŶ ϭϱ JuŶe ϮϬϭϮͿ. OŶ Ϯϴ FeďƌuaƌǇ he stƌessed that ͞“taŶdaƌds aƌe esseŶtial iŶ this 
industry, because different devices can work with each other only thanks to commonly agreed technologies. And 
because to build a modern smart phone one needs thousands of standard-essential patents, their holders often have 
considerable market power. Any company that holds these patents can effectively hold up the entire industry with the 
threat of banning the products of competitors from the market. This sort of hold-up is Ŷot aĐĐeptaďle͟ ;pƌess ƌelease 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/131, last accessed on 15 June 
ϮϬϭϮͿ. OŶ ϴ JuŶe ϮϬϭϮ he Ŷoted agaiŶ that ͞The ĐoŵpaŶies that hold staŶdaƌd-essential patents have a large market 
power, which they can use to threaten to ban the products of competitors from the market. In the worst-case 
scenario, these legal battles can effectively hold up the entire industry to the detriment of users. This is unacceptable 
and I am determined to prevent such hold-ups͟ ;pƌess ƌelease aǀailaďle at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/428, last accessed on 18 June 2012).  
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FRAND commitments and Article 102 TFEU have been complied with, and that said injunctions are 
then enforced by patentees
48
. The threat of injunctions, the seeking of injunctions and the actual 
enforcement of injunctions against a potential licensee in good faith, stressed the Commission, 
may affect competitioŶ aŶd iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ peƌsuade the defeŶdaŶt to aĐĐoŵŵodate pateŶtee͛s 
wishes: eg, the threat of an injunction ŵaǇ ĐoŶǀiŶĐe pateŶtee͛s Đoŵpetitoƌs to enter into a licence 
agreement and accept (i) contractual conditions that in normal circumstances they would never 
have accepted, such as an excessive royalty rate or (ii) an obligation on the licensee which is 
holder of non-SEPs to cross-license those non-SEPs to the patentee in exchange for a licence of the 
SEPs
49
. Then, in case injunctions are actually enforced, consumers would also be negatively 
affected as in the market there would be absence of competing products. This holds true even 
when injunctions are granted on a temporary basis. Indeed, as the Commission noted, the ICT 
market is a fast moving market so that even temporary absence of competing products could be 
detrimental to consumers
50
. 
The CoŵŵissioŶ͛s ďelief that these aĐtiǀities ŵight tuƌŶ out to ďe aŶti-competitive is reinforced by 
the recent investigation against Honeywell, Samsung and Motorola. For instance, Samsung and 
Motorola had recently asked for and enforced injunctions against competitors in several countries, 
including some EU Member States, claiming infringements of their SEPs. In particular, in the 
proceedings against Samsung the Commission investigates whether in doing so the former has 
failed to satisfy its commitments given in 1998 (when the 3G standards were adopted in Europe) 
to the European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) to license essential patents related 
to European mobile telephony standards on FRAND terms. This behavior, hinted the Commission, 
might constitute abuse of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU. 
͞Patent hold-up͟ and ͞inverse patent hold-up͟ 
Some scholars do not agree with the above arguments. Damien Geradin, for example, notes that 
in certain markets different competing standards might be available and accordingly the adoption 
of a standard by a SSO would not affect competition
51
. If implementers of the standardized 
technology are therefore free to switch to alternative technologies, whether protected by IPRs or 
not, the IPR holder would not have any incentive to carry out anti-competitive activities (eg 
increasing price) since by doing so it would lose sales
52
.  
                                                          
48
 Para 113 Google Motorola decision. 
49
 Para 107 Google Motorola decision.  
50
 Para 107 Google Motorola decision. 
51
 DaŵieŶ GeƌadiŶ, ͞PƌiĐiŶg Aďuses ďǇ EsseŶtial PateŶt Holdeƌs iŶ a “taŶdaƌd-Setting Context: a View from Europe - 
Papeƌ pƌepaƌed foƌ the ͚‘eŵedies foƌ DoŵiŶaŶt Fiƌŵ MisĐoŶduĐt͛ CoŶfeƌeŶĐe JuŶe ϰ-5 2008 – University of ViƌgiŶia͟ 
(2008), p. 7 (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1174922, last accessed on 15 June 
2012). It has also been noted that there is a number of standard-setting organizations that compete with each other: 
see European Competition Law Forum (ECLF), above note 23, p. 1. 
52
 Geradin, above note 51, p. 12 (noting that horizontal and institutional constraints would constitute further obstacles 
to the creation of market power. In particular, he argues that in case of complementary essential IPRs, the IPR holders 
will necessarily take into account the prices and royalties chosen by the owner of such complementary rights. Holders 
of IPRs essential to a standard would therefore be horizontally price-constrained. Said IPR owners would be further 
constrained by the dynamic and evolving feature of standard-setting, especially in the ICT industry, both before and 
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This opinion is based on the assumption that alternative technologies do exist, which however, 
should not be taken for granted. Indeed, in some technological fields it seems that there are no 
technologies that can be considered alternative to the adopted standard. The fact that in a certain 
market there are no alternative standards available, coupled with the fact the technology in 
question is protected by a monopolistic right, may call, in certain circumstances, for the 
application of competition rules. Yet, in this regard it has been counter-argued that in the absence 
of suitable alternative technologies, standard-setting processes cannot confer IPR holders greater 
power than the latter actually has and therefore cannot be considered responsible for the 
acquisition of market power. Such power would thus pre-exist before the adoption of the standard 
and be exclusively due to the rarity of the technology at hand
53
. 
But even in case technologies alternative to the IPR-protected standard do exist, the reality is that 
once a standard is adopted it is practically difficult and economically inconvenient for IPRs owners͛ 
competitors to switch to them. Indeed, after industry participants choose a standard and make 
substantial investments in order to implement it, alternative technologies become less 
attractive
54
. Implementers are thus soon locked-in to the adopted format and it becomes 
commercially necessary to comply with the standard
55
.  
In other words, even in case alternative technologies do exist, once the standard is adopted, an 
IPR protecting a standard may give its owner market dominance ex post that was much weaker ex 
ante and will allow its owners to extract higher supracompetitive royalties than the ones it would 
have obtained if its technology had not been selected as a standard. This behavior has been 
labelled ǁith ǀaƌious Ŷaŵes, suĐh as ͞ex post oppoƌtuŶisŵ͟56, ͞pateŶt aŵďush͟ oƌ ͞hold-up͟57. It 
can also be detrimental to consumers of products which incorporate the standardised technology 
(downstream consumers), as high royalties are usually passed on them
58
. 
The above holds true, in particular, in case of complex products. If multiple manufacturers have 
started commercialising goods that comply with the initial standard, possibly including various 
complementary products associated with said standard, switching to a non-infringing technology 
can be very expensive. IŶdeed, iŶ ĐoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ pƌoduĐts͛ ŵaƌkets ĐoŵpaŶies ofteŶ wish that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
after the adoption of a standard. In particular, the dynamic and evolving nature of standard-setting would give 
participants to SSOs the possibility to penalize in the future companies which have set very high royalties, eg by 
preventing them from contributing in future evolutions of the standard. Such ͞iŶstitutioŶal͟ ĐoŶstƌaiŶs ǁould 
persuade IPRs holders not to carry out anticompetitive activities and in particular set excessive royalties). See also 
European Competition Law Forum (ECLF), p. 12; Davis J. Teece – Edǁaƌd F. “heƌƌǇ, ͞“taŶdaƌd “ettiŶg aŶd AŶtitƌust͟ 
(2003) 87 Minnesota Law Review, p. 1913. 
53
 Geradin, above note 51, p. 12. 
54
 Farrell - Hayes - Shapiro – Sullivan, above note 42, p. 607. In the US case Broadcom Corp v Qualcomm Inc. it was 
held that a standard by definition eliminates alternative technologies and can render certain technologies much more 
valuable than alternative ones that are not adopted as standard (Broadcom Corp v Qualcomm Inc., 501 F3.d 297 (3d 
Cir. 2007). 
55
 Glader, above note 14, p. 614 (footnote 12). 
56
 Geradin, above note 51, pp. 11-12. 
57
 See also Farrell - Hayes - Shapiro – Sullivan, above note 43, p. ϲϮϰ ;ŶotiŶg that ͞pateŶt hold-up often arises when 
paƌtiĐipaŶts leaƌŶ too late aďout pateŶts esseŶtial to the staŶdaƌd͟Ϳ. 
58
 Farrell - Hayes - Shapiro – Sullivan, above note 43, p. 608. 
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their goods remain inter-operable with the initial standard (especially if the standard is a 
successful one), rather than with other technologies which have a smaller market share. For 
example, software houses are more likely to maintain applications programs that are inter-
operable ǁith MiĐƌosoft͛s opeƌatiŶg sǇsteŵ ƌatheƌ thaŶ sǁitĐhiŶg to otheƌ sǇsteŵs as theƌe aƌe faƌ 
more consumers for this product
59
. In these circumstances, the IPRs owner leverage in licensing 
comes from the inability of the alleged infringer to separate the infringing component from the 
non-infringing ones
60
. And with high switching-costs, the threat of an injunction can allow IPR 
holders to ask and obtain excessive royalties
61
. The potential for an injunction may therefore allow 
IPR owners to negotiate a settlement for an amount of money bigger than the amount they could 
realistically expect to obtain in damages based on reasonable royalties (alleged infringers are thus 
prompted to pay to avoid not the threat that they will have to design around the invention, but 
the threat that the exploitation of integrated goods – including the unprotected components, on 
which irreversible investments have been made - will be prohibited
62
). In such a case, it would not 
be the value of the IPR protected technology, but the cost incurred by the defendant in switching 
to another technology, that drives the royalty up
63
. In other terms, IPRs holders would appropriate 
ŵoƌe ǀalue thaŶ theǇ aĐtuallǇ Đƌeate aŶd ǁould ďe aďle to hold hostage the iŵpleŵeŶteƌ͛s 
standard-related investments
64
. 
It is also for the above reasons that certain authors have pushed the so-Đalled ͞ǁaiǀeƌ͟ pƌoposal. 
That means that the owner of a standard essential IPR that makes a FRAND commitment keeps its 
right to ask damages in case of infringement but impliedly waives its right to ask for an 
injunction
65
: in other words, according to this proposal, the standard essential IPR would be no 
more a proprietary right – it would become a mere compensatory right. It should however be 
noted that the seeking and enforcement of injunctions when FRANDS commitment have been 
given by the IPR holder cannot be always considered anti-competitive. They are not anti-
competitive, for example, when the prospective licensee refuses to negotiate the licence on 
FRAND terms: this was also affirmed by the Commission in Google Motorola
66
. As has been said, in 
these circumstances an ͞iŶǀeƌse pateŶt hold-up͟ ǁould take plaĐe, ͞this tiŵe Đoŵŵitted ďǇ the 
                                                          
59
 An analogous example has been given by Lemley, above note 6, pp. 1896-1899 (also noting that the willingness of 
implementers to create products compatible with another product that is an industry standard strengthens 
ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ desiƌe to puƌĐhase the pƌoduĐt eǀeƌǇoŶe else ďuǇs, a pheŶoŵeŶoŶ kŶoǁŶ as ͞tippiŶg͟).  
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standard adopter, who would be in a position to refuse the FRAND licence terms proposed by the 
pateŶtee ďut still ƌeŵaiŶ iŵŵuŶe fƌoŵ iŶjuŶĐtioŶs fƌoŵ iŶfƌiŶgeŵeŶt͟67.  
Ex ante competition as a benchmark? 
We have seen that the Guidelines, in order to avoid disputes related to FRAND commitments, 
encourage IPRs holders to disclose before the adoption of the standard the most restrictive 
licensing terms, such as the maximum royalty rate. 
Such disclosure seems to be more appropriate than merely requiring the IPR holder to undertake 
to license on FRAND terms
68
, also in light of the fact that there is no clear definition and 
understanding of teƌŵs suĐh as ͞faiƌ͟ aŶd ͞ƌeasoŶaďle͟ and accordingly subsequent FRAND-
related litigation in court cannot be ruled out. It would thus be preferable for the parties to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of a licence before the standard is adopted (which is facilitated 
by the above disclosure) rather than running the risk to subsequently renegotiate them in the 
context of a judicial proceeding, after the standard is chosen. 
A similar solution is also recommended by the Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC 
TƌeatǇ to TeĐhŶologǇ TƌaŶsfeƌ AgƌeeŵeŶts ;adopted iŶ ϮϬϬϰͿ, ǁhiĐh pƌoǀide that ͞iŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ 
circumstances it may be more efficient if the royalties are agreed before the standard is chosen 
and not after the standard is decided upon, to avoid that the choice of the standard confers a 
significant degree of ŵaƌket poǁeƌ oŶ oŶe oƌ ŵoƌe esseŶtial teĐhŶologies͟69. 
The above argument is mainly based on the assumption that a reasonable royalty is the royalty 
that the IPR owner can obtain before the adoption of the standard, when the owner faces 
competition, and not after the relevant choice is made, ie when there is a monopoly which allows 
the extraction of high royalties
70. As has ďeeŶ Ŷoted, ͞the specificity and transparency of price 
information ex ante is pro-competitive. It allows the potential licensees in the SSO to understand 
the price they would pay for incorporating the technology into the standard and so allows 
competition on price as well as on technical merit in the standard setting deliberations. Moreover, 
                                                          
67
 Geradin – Rato, above note 8, p. 17. 
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it assures that the price is competitive as opposed to the supracompetitive price that potential 
liĐeŶsees ŵight faĐe iŶ the aďseŶĐe of Đleaƌ pƌiĐe iŶfoƌŵatioŶ eǆ aŶte͟71.   
The level of ƌoǇaltǇ should theƌefoƌe ďe ͞ĐƌǇstallized͟ ex ante and no increase could be made after 
a standard has been chosen. This is also in line with the already mentioned Paragraph 289 of the 
Guidelines which provides criteria for determining whether a fee charged for access to IPR is unfair 
or unreasonable: in that paragraph the Guidelines recommend inter alia to compare the licensing 
fees charged by the company at issue for the relevant IPR in a competitive scenario before the 
industry has been locked into the standard (ex ante) with those charged after the adoption of the 
standard (ex post).  
These arguments are disputed by some commentators. For example, Damien Geradin believes 
that there is no reason to prevent IPRs holders from charging higher rates ex post than ex ante
72
. 
The parties to the licence agreement (the IPR owner and the implementer of the standard) should 
therefore be free to re-negotiate the terms of the contract including the level of royalty after the 
adoption of the standard. This is due to the fact that before the implementation of the standard 
the parties may not have a complete understanding of the commercial exploitation of the 
technology in question and of the value of the patent, which may only be realised in a subsequent 
moment
73
. 
In general, according to this school of thought, defining the level of royalties in conformity with an 
imposed and premature pricing structure would harshly limit the ability of IPR owners and 
implementers to negotiate bilateral commercial terms that reflect their respective interests: what 
is fair and reasonable should instead be decided by the parties on a case-by-case basis without any 
interference from SSOs
74
. Such interference, it is argued, should be avoided as it could keep 
innovators away from SSOs works
75
 and severely harm their ability to fund the research and 
development activities, which in turn would be detrimental to consumers and the competitive 
processes in general
76
. 
5. Some proposals 
                                                          
71
 MacCarthy, above note 5, p. 11. 
72
 Geradin, above note 51, pp. 17-18. 
73
 Geradin, above note 51, pp. 17-18. 
74
 Brooks – Geradin, above note 45, p. 14; European Competition Law Forum (ECLF), above note 23, p. 11. See also 
‘iĐhaƌd “. Taffet, ͞Eǆ AŶte LiĐeŶsiŶg iŶ “taŶdaƌds DeǀelopŵeŶt: MǇths aŶd ‘ealitǇ͟, papeƌ pƌeseŶted to AIPLA “pƌiŶg 
Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, 4 May 2006 (available on the Internet at 
http://www.bingham.com/Publications/Files/2006/05/Ex-Ante-Licensing-in-Standards-Development-Myths-and-
Reality, last accessed on 8 August 2012). 
75
 Geradin – Rato, above note 8, p. 10, footŶote ϯϯ ;ŶotiŶg that ͞it is likelǇ that if ĐoŵpaŶies peƌĐeiǀe that 
participation in the standard-setting process threatens patent portfolios, there will be a significant reluctance to 
paƌtiĐipate iŶ the pƌoĐess͟Ϳ. 
76
 Geradin, above note 51, p. 19. See also Jaŵes C. DeVellis, ͞PateŶtiŶg IŶdustƌǇ “taŶdaƌds: BalaŶĐiŶg the ‘ights of 
Patent Holders with the Need for Industry-Wide “taŶdaƌds͟ ;ϮϬϬϯͿ ϯϭ AIPLA Q.J. ϯϬϭ, p. ϯϰϯ ;stƌessiŶg that ͞if a 
standard organization adopts an infeior standard because someone owns a patent on a superior technology and 
refuses to make it available on RF [royalty-free] terms, the standard-setting organization runs a real risk that the 
chosen standard will not be widely adopted).  
16 | P a g e  
 
A number of additional proposals have been made that address inter alia the competition-related 
concerns stemming from standard essential IPRs. It is of interest to briefly analyse them. All these 
proposals share a common feature, ie they aim at neutralising, punishing or discouraging anti-
competitive, or anyhow unlawful, behaviours of the owners of standard essential IPRs. Most of 
these proposals have been made with reference to the US scenario, but the author believes they 
could validly work in the European legal landscape too. 
(i) With particular reference to the non-discrimination principle, it has been proposed to intensify 
the use of most-favoured licensee clauses. This clause – which is already quite common in the field 
in question - requires the owner of the standard essential IPR to promptly notify a licensee of any 
licence granted by him to a third party for the same IPR under analogous circumstances which give 
rise to terms and conditions that are clearly more favourable than those granted to that licensee. 
This allows the latter to require the IPR holder the replacement of the terms and conditions of its 
licence with those of the other third party
77. ;This Đlause Đalls to ŵiŶd the ͞ŵost-faǀouƌed ŶatioŶ͟ 
(MFN) clause inserted in many international trade agreements, according to which a country that 
has been accorded MFN status cannot be treated less advantageously than any other country with 
which the promising country has entered into a similar agreement). To put it bluntly, such a clause 
aims at promising that no other licensee will obtain better terms and conditions
78
. This proposal 
would complement the Guidelines, which do not give clear clarifications and determination 
Đƌiteƌia as to the ͞ND͟ ĐoŵpoŶeŶt of F‘AND, ie theǇ do Ŷot ŵake Đleaƌ ǁhat ͞ŶoŶ disĐƌiŵiŶatoƌǇ͟ 
really means. 
(ii) Proposals have also been made which give IPRs holders incentives to disclose their IPRs before 
a decision to standardise a particular technology has been made
79
. For example, SSOs which 
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impose on holders of standard essential IPRs a duty of disclosure could adopt a rule that either 
requires undisclosed rights to be licensed on a royalty-free basis
80
 or at least limits the royalties 
that can be charged on undisclosed IPRs (so-Đalled ͞ƌoǇaltǇ-ĐappiŶg͟ appƌoaĐhͿ, with no power of 
the right owners to seek injunctions
81
: this would de facto amounts to a penalty or even to a 
compulsory licence against the IPR owner that has not complied with his duty of disclosure
82
. A 
similar rule could also be proposed where IPRs owners do not wish to grant voluntary licences on 
non-discriminatory terms. If adopted, these proposals would witness a transformation of standard 
essential IPRs from proprietary to compensatory rights. 
Compulsory licensing style approaches have been criticized. First, the opponents of such proposals 
note that the case law, especially from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), admits 
compulsory licences only in limited and exceptional circumstances
83
. Second, a compulsory 
liĐeŶsiŶg sǇsteŵ ǁould faĐilitate ǁhat has ďeeŶ Đalled ͞foƌkiŶg͟, ie the fƌagŵeŶtatioŶ of the 
standard amongst different systems. Indeed, if no company is in a position of exercising exclusive 
rights on a given standard, a risk exists that SSO participants depart from the standard itself and 
adopt incompatible technologies, with the very purpose of standardisation being severely 
jeopardised. This is precisely what standardisation processes should aim to avoid, as standards, in 
particular interoperability standards, increase confidence that there will be many users and that 
the industry will not fragment among different variants of the original standard
84
. Fragmentation 
would not occur if the IPR holder instead reserves his exclusive rights to prohibit any commercial 
activity related to the standard including its modification
85
. This argument is a valuable one and 
could be relied on to oppose compulsory licensing approaches. Yet it may be counter-argued that 
SSO participants could be only granted compulsory rights (either at zero or capped royalties) 
provided that licensees formally undertake not to depart from the standard; and that should 
licensees fail to comply with this undertaking they would lose their licence. In such a manner the 
IPR holder would remain in a position to exercise their exclusive rights (and indirectly making 
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substantial contribution to controlling the development of the standard) without however being 
able to prohibit third parties to implement it in a compliant way
86
. 
(iii) Another proposal has been made which would also be based on an ex ante approach. In 
particular, it has been proposed that SSOs adopt and manage auctions between different 
technologies. More precisely, IPR owners willing to have their technology included in the standard 
would submit to SSOs offers to licence their IPR specifying the level of royalty requested. The 
implementers would then proceed to choose the most convenient offer
87
. The supporters of this 
proposal believe that such an auction would provide good result and in particular a benchmark for 
what is a fair and reasonable royalty, as it would reflect the level of competition between IPR 
owners and implementers that exists before the adoption of the standard. 
(iv) We have seen that a rule could be imposed that requires undisclosed IPRs to be licensed on a 
royalty-free basis. Some SSOs adopt an even more straightforward approach: they mandate 
royalty-free licensing as a requirement for participation to the work of the organization. This 
approach aims at keeping the access to the standardised technology as open as possible and thus 
reducing the costs of the products that incorporate that technology. In such a way, patent hold-up 
problems are ruled out and accordingly risks of patent related litigation are minimized. The 
Guidelines also stress that the concept of FRAND may include royalty-free licensing
88
. In particular, 
they note that, as the risks related to effective access in case onerous royalties are imposed are 
not the same as in case of SSO with a royalty-free standards policy, the disclosure of the 
associated IPRs would not be relevant in that context
89
: this means that in case of royalty-free 
licensing IPRs holders do not have to promptly disclose the existence of standard essential IPRs in 
order to take advantage of the safe harbour exception. 
This licensing approach has been criticised as it would (again) amount to a compulsory licence. It 
has been noted that imposing a royalty-free licensing system would prevent investors from 
recouping the investments made to come up with the standardised technology: with the result 
that said investments would be discouraged. How could an IPR holder, the argument goes, be 
prompted to join a SSO if the latter requires him to give up any royalty in relation to the 
technology he has invented or is about to invent? 
It has been counter-argued that IPR owners are not obliged to join SSOs. Royalty-free licences are 
not mandated by the government, but they are voluntarily accepted by private parties that want 
to become member of a standard setting organisation
90
. If an IPR holder wants to be rewarded for 
its invention by means of royalties, he could decide to remain outside the SSO and avoid accepting 
royalty-free licensing schemes. In such a way he could still get royalties in case the SSO chooses to 
adopt a standard whose implementation requires the use of his patented technology (it might 
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indeed happen that a standard setting organization eventually adopts a technology developed by 
a non-member). This latter circumstance is possible, but rather rare. As a matter of fact, by not 
participating to the SSO works, the IPR holder basically gives up good chances to influence the 
ĐhoiĐe of the staŶdaƌd. But, as Maƌk MaĐCaƌthǇ puts it, the IP‘ oǁŶeƌ ͞should Ŷot haǀe it ďoth 
ways – demanding both to be rewarded for innovative activity and also to influence the 
deǀelopŵeŶt of a staŶdaƌd that ǁould faĐilitate that ƌeǁaƌd͟91. The IPR owner should therefore 
forego some of his exclusive rights in exchange for the chance to have his technology included in a 
standard. Mark MacCarthy also notes that even if the IPR holder accepts a royalty-free licensing 
scheme, he could still be rewarded for his inventive activity in manufacturing and marketing goods 
associated with the standard: the IPR owner would thus be able to reap the benefits of his 
technology by charging royalties for uses of said technology outside uses essential to standards 
implementation
92
. 
(v) It has also been proposed that participants to a SSO should be allowed to collectively negotiate 
royalty rates on behalf of standard implementers, so as to counterbalance the strong bargaining 
power owned and exercised by holders of standard essential IPRs
93
. This proposal has been 
criticised because it would allegedly infringe competition rules and in particular Article 101 TFEU 
which prohibits restrictive agreements (in particular it would be detrimental to final consumers). 
The author does not believe that collective negotiations in this field would infringe competition 
provisions. On the contrary, it seems that a collective licensing approach may benefit consumers 
and therefore could be exempted under Paragraph 3 of Article 101 TFEU. Indeed, collective 
negotiations would likely trigger competitive royalties, which could then be passed on end-
consumers. 
(vi) In case owners of standard essential IPRs fail to disclose their rights to the SSO the equitable 
estoppel doctrine has also been indicated as a possible defence to be invoked by alleged 
infringers
94
 (this proposal falls outside the realm of competition law). In common law jurisdictions 
equitable estoppel allows a court not to grant a judgment or other legal reliefs to a party who has 
not acted fairly, eg by having made false representations or concealing material facts from the 
other party. This doctrine does apply to IPRs as well. Indeed, a patent owner, through a misleading 
conduct, may lead the alleged infringer to reasonably infer that the former does not wish to 
enforce its exclusive rights against the latter
95
. To be able to successfully invoke this doctrine, the 
alleged iŶfƌiŶgeƌ should deŵoŶstƌate that he ƌelied oŶ pateŶtee͛s ŵisleadiŶg ďehaǀioƌ aŶd that he 
would be jeopardised if exclusive rights are enforced against him. 
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The equitable doctrine seems therefore to be appropriate in case owners of standard essential 
IPRs omit to disclose their rights before a standard is adopted
96
. The implementer that is 
thƌeateŶed ďǇ the IP‘ holdeƌ͛s aĐtioŶ should ďe aďle to shoǁ that he had a good faith ďelief that 
no IPRs covered the standard in question
97
. This principle does not require affirmatively misleading 
statements on the part of the IPR owner, but it could also apply in cases in which the right holder 
has a clear duty to speak: thus, when it comes to applying this principle to cases where IPR owners 
have contractual obligation to disclose their rights before the adoption of a standard, a breach of 
that obligation would trigger estoppel
98
. In the US this doctrine has been interpreted very broadly. 
For example, in Stambler v. Diebold the judge fouŶd estoppel oŶ the ďasis of pateŶtee͛s ĐoŶduĐt iŶ 
the ĐoŶteǆt of aŶ ““O eǀeŶ aďseŶt a speĐifiĐ ““O ƌule ŵaŶdatiŶg disĐlosuƌe ;pateŶtees͛ ŵisleadiŶg 
statements, noted further the court, need not to be made to the SSO, they could be made 
generally to the marketplace)
99
. Companies that are not members of the SSO, it has also been 
proposed,  should be able to invoke the doctrine in question and thus rely on representations and 
disclosures made by the IPR holder
100
. 
(vi) In addition to the equitable estoppel doctrine, it has also been proposed that, in case an IPR 
owner has an obligation to disclose his exclusive rights on a given standard and knowingly omits to 
do so or states that no rights exist, a SSO participant would be able to invoke fraud (again this 
proposal remains outside the realm of competition law)
101
. 
6. Concluding remarks 
We have seen that standardisation processes and in particular standardisation agreements 
adopted ďǇ ““Os ŵaǇ ƌaise iŶ soŵe ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes deliĐate ĐoŵpetitioŶ issues ;ďoth ͞eǆĐlusioŶ͟ 
aŶd ͞ĐollusioŶ͟Ϳ. AŶti-competitive concerns may be further exacerbated when standardised 
technologies are protected by IPRs and the owners of such rights maliciously use standardisation 
processes to increase and abuse their dominance of a certain market or anyhow restrict 
competition. 
The ϮϬϭϭ CoŵŵissioŶ͛s GuideliŶes, which encourage owners of essential IPRs to disclose their 
rights before the adoption of the standard as well as to give FRAND commitments, are a good 
answer to those concerns.  
Two different schools of thought, however, exist about whether competition law remedies should 
apply to these scenarios to correct possible anti-competitive behaviours of the holders of standard 
essential IPRs. On the one hand, the European Commission obviously threatens to rely on such 
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remedies with a view to preserving or restoring the competitive nature of the market in question. 
On the other hand, IPRs owners and their legal advisors believe that market forces and contractual 
negotiations, far from unearthing power imbalances between the various stakeholders, are 
sufficient to reach a fair balance between the positions and interests of developers and 
implementers of standardised technologies.    
 
